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In an era of heightened partisanship, animosity, and gridlock, the 
chances of federal action to combat climate change seem increasingly 
bleak at best. In response to the federal administrative machine 
slowing and eight years of regulatory schemes being altered, in 
regards to climate change, state governments have the ability, and 
precedent, to methodically begin to step in and fill the gap left by the 
administrative state. This note discusses the power and authority of 
state action to address climate change and later moves to a thorough 
examination of existing climate change initiatives at the state level. 
In addition, this note gathers and explores potential abilities of state 
governments to respond to climate change through their vested 
powers and instruments. Finally, this note illustrates and examines 
several examples of state actors already taking the helm. This note 
more broadly contends that (1) states themselves have increasingly 
significant capability to address climate change and (2) there exists 
ample bipartisan, and modern, precedent from various state actors 
in the environmental and climate change arena providing a 
framework for modern state action. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
November 6th, 2012, 11:15AM, hours before Governor Romney's 
defeat, President, then citizen, Donald J. Trump tweeted "The 
concept of global warming was created by and for the Chinese in 
order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive. 1 The President 
has been unclear if he maintains this belief, 2 but the new EPA 
Administrator has made it unequivocally obvious the Trump 
1. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWIITER (Nov. 6, 2012, 11:15AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/265895292191248385?lang=en. 
2. See generally John Schwartz, Trump's Climate Views: Combative, Conflicting and 
Confusing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/climate/donald-
trump-global-warming-views.html (examining statements made by President Trump 
regarding climate change). 
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Administration will not be spearheading climate change progress.3 
Indeed, it appears the federal arena is no longer the battlefield in 
the fight against climate change. 
So, what is to be done? The existence of climate change has near 
universal consensus in the scientific community;4 but public policy 
initiatives are no less needed now than they were previously. The 
Note argues our Republic's system of cooperative federalism 
provides the future for combating climate change. This Note works 
to show that states are afforded a wealth of opportunity to take 
action. 
Common sense dictates that perhaps the last thing these 
initiatives need are legal quarrels challenging authority. Discussion 
and examination of various sources of authority for state action 
bring clarity to the occasionally tangled legal framework of dual 
sovereignty. Federal climate change and environmental action has 
long been the subject of derision from opponents; 5 conservatives 
have previously insisted state and local governments should have a 
larger role in environmental regulation than the federal 
government. 6 This Note illustrates that states, however, have 
distinct and at times more steadfast sources of authorization to fight 
climate change. How states are handed the power to make law 
regarding the environment and how states codify that authority 
within their var10us charters and constitutions warrant 
examination. 
There has been climate change action seen at the state level, but 
what form does it take? State bodies have worked to implement, 
occasionally in a bipartisan fashion, various steps to address climate 
change. Further, it appears the state climate change initiatives 
already seen were not solely to pander to various demographics or 
electorates; state bodies empowered and implemented programs 
that made change and avoided politics. 
First, the Note examines, illustrates, and cements authority for 
state action. After, this Note scrutinizes California's AB32, or the 
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, and discuss legislative action 
and precedent. Finally, the Note moves to examine tools the 
3. See generally Brady Dennis & Chris Mooney, On Climate Change, Scott Pruitt 
Causes an Uproar-and Contradicts the EPA's Own Website, WASH. POST Mar. 9, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/03/09/on-climate-
change-scott-pruitt-contradicts-the-epas-own-website/?utm_term=.8f42634e2dda (discussing 
EPA Administrator Pruitt's controversial comments on climate change). 
4. Clare Foran, Donald Trump and the Triumph of Climate-Change Denial, THE 
ATLANTIC, Dec. 25, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/donald-trump-
climate-change-skeptic-denial/510359/. 
5. Barton H. Thompson Jr., Conservative Environmental Thought: The Bush 
Administration and Environmental Policy, 32 ECOLOGYL.Q. 307, 344-45 (2005). 
6. Id. 
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legislature has in tandem with the executive, and pertinent 
parallels to Governor Rockefeller's work in State of New York. Next, 
discussion of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and 
the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord proves 
illuminating. Then, this Note dissects and elaborates on the 
Minnesota Office of Enterprise Sustainability, an inter-agency 
watchdog organization similar to the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs. This Note moves to then examine the 
Washington State Carbon Tax initiative to illustrate another 
excellent tool at the disposal of states. Finally, this Note explores 
information-gathering commissions and committees. 
Several sections and subsections are dedicated to potential tools 
at the disposal of state governments. While much precedent has 
been set, not every tool and resource has been exhausted. This Note 
works to broadly discuss the tools reserved by state governments 
between discussion of precedent and recent action. 
The last subsection of this Note works to show the proposals 
argued in action, already. Several examples of state actors bucking 
the federal government's lead and taking action utilizing state 
authority warrant examination. These recent actions could create 
resounding precedent and work as a catalyst for further state action. 
This Note serves not to provide politicized actors with a route to 
circumvent the President in a deceptive fashion, but to illustrate the 
very real and very legal authority and actions states have and can 
take to combat climate change. There can be no doubt many of the 
state actions witnessed are born of partisanship; nonetheless, these 
actions rely on steadfast authority. This Note advocates for an 
alternate path forward, the path of wanton legality, the path well-
traveled, and the path that can serve to make a real difference in 
climate change. 
II. THE AUTHORITY FOR STATE CLIMATE CHANGE INITIATIVES 
A. The U.S. Constitution 
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved 
to the states respectively, or to the people."7 
The promise of the Republic guarantees states a role as a 
sovereign in their individual realms, and thus, the ability to protect 
their lands and environment.8 Chief Justice Taft famously opined, 
7. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
8. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713-14 (1999). 
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"We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different 
sources, capable of dealing with the same subject-matter within the 
same territory. Each may, without interference by the other, enact 
laws to secure prohibition, with the limitation that no legislation 
can give validity to acts prohibited by the amendment." 9 This 
section works to untangle the interwoven strings of authority 
granted to the states and federal government to regulate climate 
change and the environment. 
Criticisms of climate change or environmental action, especially 
criticisms of a political nature, range from a larger role for states, 
overregulation, and even skepticism of the need for environmental 
protection. IO Federal environmental regulations are still such a 
source of ire to some that as recently as February of 2017 a 
bill was drafted in the House of Representatives to 
abolish the Environmental Protection Agency altogether. 11 Federal 
environmental regulation has long been hobbled by the need for 
state and local cooperation to implement initiatives-geography, 
costs, and resources have required local governments to work with 
the federal government. 12 
The Supreme Court previously enumerated state interest and 
sovereignty, in regards to environmental and land use regulation, 
distinct from federal interests. 13 What has come to be known as the 
"quasi-sovereign" interest in protecting the land of the state or 
commonwealth was perhaps most notably observed in Tennessee 
Copper, 14 which served to solidify the state's role in environmental 
protection. 15 "[The state] has the last word as to whether its 
mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall 
breathe pure air." 16 States witnessed their right to control and 
protect their land enumerated. 17 
Much of the legal analysis regarding the interests and controls 
vested in the states takes legal analysis and discussion from the 
nation's foundation into consideration. Opinions addressing state 
standing and sovereignty show justices considering what states 
9. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). 
10. Thompson, supra note 5, at 312-13. 
11. To Terminate the Environmental Protection Agency, H.R. 861, 115th Cong. (2017). 
12. Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating 
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977). 
13. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 327 (1907). 
14. Id. 
15. See Robert V. Percival, The Frictions of Federalism: The Rise and Fall of the Federal 
Common Law of Interstate Nuisance (U. of Maryland, Pub-Law Research Paper No. 2003-02, 
2003), https://ssrn.com/abstract=452922 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.452922 (discussing 
the quasi-sovereign interest doctrine and dogma). 
16. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237. 
17. North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 439 F. Supp. 2d 486, 
489 (W.D.N.C. 2006). 
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forfeited individually when joining the union and what powers they 
retained; Madison, The Federalist Papers or various framers of the 
Constitution end up cited in quasi-sovereign legal analysis. 18 
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak & Circle Village would later 
discuss this in a 1991 Supreme Court ruling: "[t]he States entered 
the federal system with their sovereignty intact." 19 The principle 
iterated through Federalist No. 39, "a residuary and inviolable 
[state] sovereignty," recurs in state sovereignty discussion.20 
The following section discusses how state constitutions have 
enshrined their own authority to regulate and take environmental 
action given the Federal Constitution's grant of power. Which state 
actors are granted which powers, and the manner in which states 
created the constitutional provisions guaranteeing the power to 
regulate is remarkably unique. 
B. State Constitutions 
"The United States shall guarantee to every state in this 
union a republican form of government, and shall protect 
each of them against invasion; and on application of the 
legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot 
b d) . d . . 1 ,,21 e convene against omestic v10 ence. 
The Guarantee Clause promises each state an individualized 
government and constitution. 22 Still, some scholars and 
commentators raise questions on the validity of state constitutions 
and their constitutionality to even come in to existence at all. 23 
Nevertheless, the strong federal interest for maintaining state 
charters and constitutions lies within the Guarantee Clause.24 
Below, this Note discusses various state constitution provisions 
pertinent to climate change initiatives. Separate from uncertainty 
of the validity of state constitutions, some skepticism has been 
18. See e.g., Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934). 
19. 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991). 
20. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison). For discussion of the use of this principle 
by the Supreme Court, see generally Michael J. Mano, Contemporary Visions of the Early 
Federalist Ideology of James Madison: An Analysis of the United States Supreme Court's 
Treatment of the Federalist No. 39, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 257, (2004). 
21. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
22. See Thomas A. Smith, Note, The Rule of Law and the States: A New Interpretation 
of the Guarantee Clause, 93 YALE L.J. 561, 566 (1984) (broadly examining the Guarantee 
Clause). 
23. Jack L. Landau, Some Thoughts About State Constitutional Interpretation, 115 PA 
ST. L. REV. 837, 839 (2011). 
24. Jacob M. Heller, Death by A Thousand Cuts: The Guarantee Clause Regulation of 
State Constitutions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1711, 1718 (2010) (analyzing the interplay between state 
constitutional doctrine and the Guarantee Clause). 
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sparked from the stark contrast in length, amendment 
process, and revision procedure among the individual states.25 State 
constitutional revision and amendment is widely varied. 26 West 
Virginia's Constitution has a provision discussing lotteries, raffles, 
and bingo.27 Minnesota's Constitution grants citizens the right to 
"peddle the products of a farm or garden" without a license.28 This 
codification of varied and unusual provisions serves as a precedent 
working to the advantage of advocates for state action in climate 
change as several states guarantee environmental dignity to their 
citizens. 
1. Provisions Inspired by Federal Actions 
The initial passage of environmental legislation and the growth 
of the environmental movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
that began federal presence in preservation of the environment 
had resounding effects on state constitutions.29 Public support for 
environmental safeguards, at the time, was relatively widespread, 30 
and in the early stages of regulatory presence in the environment, a 
movement formed for environmental protection to be preserved in 
state constitutions; fortunately, support for initial environmental 
regulation was mildly more bipartisan. 31 Republican Governor 
Francis Sargent signed environmental protection bills into law and 
led Massachusetts when the provision was added to their 
Constitution in 1972. 32 Below, a sample of various state 
constitutional provisions is included, some of which are state bills of 
rights, all are a product of the early environmental movement. 
25. E.g., id.; Daniel B. Rodriguez, Change That Matters: An Essay on State 
Constitutional Development, 115 PA ST. L. REV. 1073, 1074 (2011). 
26. Michael G. Colantuono, Comment, The Revision of American State Constitutions: 
Legislative Power, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1473, 
1477-78 (1987). 
27. W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 36. (subsection titled "Lotteries; Bingo; Raffles; County 
Option"). 
28. MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 7. (subsection titled "No License Required to Peddle"). 
29. See Bruce Ledewitz, The Challenge of, and Judicial Response to, Environmental 
Provisions in State Constitutions, 4 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 33, 33--34 (1991) (broadly 
showing federal and state court confusion and reluctance in interpreting state constitutions). 
30. See generally Chris Mooney, When Did Republicans Start Hating 
the Environment?, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.motherjones.com/ 
environment/2014/08/republicans-environment-hate-polarization (illustrating historical 
context for political polarization in regards to environmental legislation, regulation, and law). 
31. Jaime Fuller, Environmental Policy Is Partisan. It Wasn't Always, WASH. POST, 
June 2, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/06/02/su pport-for-the-
clean-air-act· has-changed-a-lot-since-1970/?utm_term = .cc2f 453b5527. 
32. See Richard Evans, Conservation Conveyancing: When Your Client Is Posterity, 
37 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 201, 203 (2015) (discussing environmental litigation and early 
foundations). 
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The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to 
the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic 
values of the environment. Pennsylvania's public natural 
resources are the common property of all the people, 
including generations yet to come. As trustee of these 
resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain 
them for the benefit of all the people.33 
The people shall continue to enjoy and freely exercise all 
the rights of fishery, and the privileges of the shore, to which 
they have been heretofore entitled under the charter and 
usages of this state, including but not limited to fishing from 
the shore, the gathering of seaweed, leaving the shore to 
swim in the sea and passage along the shore; and they shall 
be secure in their rights to the use and enjoyment of the 
natural resources of the state with due regard for the 
preservation of their values; and it shall be the duty of the 
general assembly to provide for the conservation of the air, 
land, water, plant, animal, mineral and other natural 
resources of the state, and to adopt all means necessary and 
proper by law to protect the natural environment of the 
people of the state by providing adequate resource planning 
for the control and regulation of the use of the natural 
resources of the state and for the preservation, regeneration 
and restoration of the natural environment of the state. 34 
The people shall have the right to clean air and water, 
freedom from excessive and unnecessary noise, and the 
natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic qualities of their 
environment; and the protection of the people in their right 
to the conservation, development and utilization of the 
agricultural, mineral, forest, water, air and other natural 
resources is hereby declared to be a public purpose. 
The general court shall have the power to enact 
legislation necessary or expedient to protect such rights. 
In the furtherance of the foregoing powers, the general 
court shall have the power to provide for the taking, upon 
payment of just compensation therefor, or for the acquisition 
by purchase or otherwise, of lands and easements or such 
other interests therein as may be deemed necessary to 
accomplish these purposes. 
33. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
34. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17. 
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Lands and easements taken or acquired for such 
purposes shall not be used for other purposes or otherwise 
disposed of except by laws enacted by a two thirds vote, taken 
35 by yeas and nays, of each branch of the general court. 
All persons are born free and have certain inalienable 
rights. They include the right to a clean and healthful 
environment and the rights of pursuing life's basic 
necessities, enjoying and defending their lives and liberties, 
acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and seeking 
their safety, health and happiness in all lawful ways. In 
enjoying these rights, all persons recognize corresponding 
"b"l" . 36 respons1 1 1ties. 
Fortuitously, for activists and enthusiasts, these prov1s10ns, 
generally, have yet to be removed from state constitutions following 
the national hyper-politicization of environmental regulation. It 
should be noted, that when states begin to take the reigns and start 
to have a serious role in addressing climate change, and source their 
authority exclusively to these provisions, state actors of opposing 
stances likely have paths to remove these provisions.37 
2. Recreation of Federal Authority 
The Federal Constitution is remarkably concise when 
held in comparison to state constitutions. 38 As previously, stated, 
states share authority with the federal government to begin 
environmental regimes. 39 As with the prior subsection and the 
following subsections, excerpts from varied state constitutions 
illustrating this point have been included. 
"The Governor shall take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed."40 
"The supreme executive power of this state shall be vested in 
a governor, who shall be responsible for the enforcement of 
the laws of this state."41 
35. MASS. CONST. art. XCVII, §3. 
36. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
37. See generally Rodriguez, supra note 25; Colantuono, supra note 26. 
38. Landau, supra note 23, at 839. 
39. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. 
40. N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5. 
41. KAN. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
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" ... and they shall have all other powers necessary for the 
Legislature of a free and sovereign State; but they shall have 
no power to add to, alter, abolish, or infringe any part of this 
Constitution."42 
"The General Assembly shall have the power to make all 
laws not inconsistent with this Constitution, and not 
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, which it 
shall deem necessary and proper for the welfare of the 
state."43 
These provisions echo the Federal Constitution's Necessary and 
Proper Clause for Congress and the Take Care Clause for 
the President-the two have enabled a great deal of federal 
environmental action,44 alongside the Commerce Clause.45 Thus, it 
can be inferred that granting similar powers to state legislatures, 
with minimal federalism principles binding states, enables climate 
change and environmental legislation from the statehouses. 
3. Allocation of Power and Responsibility Within State 
Governments by Constitutional Provisions 
This Note moves to now illustrate how state constitutions can 
begin to provide directives or mandates for which state actors are to 
draw instruction on how to act upon environmental issues. The 
provided provisions detail natural resources broadly and are absent 
climate change specific language. More generally, these provisions 
can be seen to create stability and allocate power deliberately and 
. . 1n a precise manner. 
The natural resources of the state, including air and 
water, and the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality 
of the environment shall be protected, conserved, and 
replenished insofar as possible and consistent with the 
health, safety, and welfare of the people. The legislature 
shall enact laws to implement this policy.46 
42. VT. CONST. Ch. II, § 6. 
43. GA. CONST. art. III, § 6. 
44. See Kate Andrias, The President's Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1064 
(2013) (discussing the foundation for federal action in regards to the environment). 
45. James R. May, Healthcare, Environmental Law, and the Supreme Court: An 
Analysis Under the Commerce, Necessary and Proper, and Tax and Spending Clauses, 43 
ENVTL. L. 233, 245 (2013). 
46. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
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For the benefit of present and future generations, the 
State and its political subdivisions shall conserve and protect 
Hawaii's natural beauty and all natural resources, including 
land, water, air, minerals and energy sources, and shall 
promote the development and utilization of these resources 
in a manner consistent with their conservation and in 
furtherance of the self-sufficiency of the State. 
All public natural resources are held in trust by the State 
for the benefit of the people.47 
"It shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect 
its natural resources and scenic beauty. Adequate provision 
shall be made by law for the abatement of air and water 
pollution and of excessive and unnecessary noise and for the 
. d . f 1 "48 conservat10n an protect10n o natura resources. 
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Crucial to the notion of modern separation of powers doctrine 
and jurisprudence is the preservation of powers within each 
individual branch of governance. 49 State constitution provisions 
assigning specific duty and authority over environmental or natural 
resource action are, essentially, a double-edged sword. Despite the 
precedential benefits, these prevent any government actor, aside 
from the constitutionally designated actor, from taking action when 
acting solely on the subject matter enumerated by the state 
constitution. Thus, these may benefit those actors who are 
opponents of climate change initiatives. 
4. Self-Executing Environmental Provisions 
The aforementioned provisions expressly address paths and 
concerns regarding law and rule making. However, this Note shifts 
to show that state constitutions retain the capacity to go beyond 
just preservation of power to regulate climate change or the 
environment, and almost begin to govern by dictating state action. 
The following examples are limited to pertinent constitutional 
provis10ns regarding the environment, but action through 
constitutional amendment and revision is by no means limited to 
environmental matters. 
47. HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1. 
48. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7. 
49. See Josh Blackman, Donald Trump's Constitution of One, THE NAT'L REV. 
(May 12, 2016), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/435296/donald-trumps-constitution-
end-separation-powers. 
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The fees, monies, or funds arising from the operation and 
transactions of said Commission and from the application 
and the administration of the laws and regulations 
pertaining to the bird, fish, game and wildlife resources of 
the State and from the sale of property used for said purposes 
shall be expended and used by said Commission for the 
control, management, restoration, conservation and 
regulation of the bird, fish, game and wildlife resources of the 
State, including the purchase or other acquisition of property 
for said purposes, and for the administration of the laws 
pertaining thereto and for no other purpose. 50 
The people of the State of Colorado intend that the net 
proceeds of every state-supervised lottery game operated 
under the authority of Article XVIII, Section 2 shall be 
guaranteed and permanently dedicated to the preservation, 
protection, enhancement and management of the state's 
wildlife, park, river, trail and open space heritage, except as 
specifically provided in this article. Accordingly, there shall 
be established the Great Outdoors Colorado Program to 
preserve, protect, enhance and manage the state's wildlife, 
k . ·1 d h . 51 par , river, trai an open space entage. 
Common sense dictates provisions akin to the listed examples 
are capable of being seen more frequently in states with 
constitutional amendment and revision schemes that allow 
for frequent plebiscite amendment and revision. 52 These provide an 
advantageous path for a motivated electorate, if state actors are 
unengaged in climate change or environmental issues. 53 
5. In Summation 
Over half the states have addressed natural resources or other 
environmental concerns in their constitutions.54 As climate change 
action begins to be taken on at the state level, a second 
environmental movement may lie, waiting to catch fire. The beauty 
of these provisions is that they wait in the shadows as a resource, 
50. OKLA. CONST. art. XXVI, § 4. 
51. COLO. CONST. art. XXVII, § 1. 
52. See generally Robert F. Williams, Evolving State Constitutional Processes of 
Adoption, Revision, and Amendment: The Path Ahead, 69 ARK. L. REV. 553, 554-62 (2016). 
53. John C. Tucker, Constitutional Codification of an Environmental Ethic, 52 FLA. L. 
REV. 299, 325 (2000). 
54. Id. at 307. 
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while the dangers and perils of climate change increase. 55 Some 
previously enumerated prov1s10ns listed in states' bill of 
rights-Pennsylvania's, as an example, "[t]he people have a right to 
clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, 
historic and esthetic values of the environment"-can be used 
as a source of action. 56 If President Trump's environmental non-
enforcement regime and rollback of Obama-era climate change 
policies motivate state actors in Pennsylvania, they can claim the 
mandate provided by the Pennsylvania State Constitution. This 
provision calls for the state to preserve the people's right to natural 
rights like clean air or pure water. 
The excerpts and examples provided are not an exhaustive list 
purporting to be absolute, rather an illustrative, substantive subset 
showing the varied nature of state constitution and environmental 
authority. Statehouses and capitols will likely emerge as the next 
battlefield for climate change initiatives, and fortunately, there is 
ample authority for them to act-both in the Federal Constitution 
and state constitutions-and no shortage of need. 
III. THE GLOBAL WARMING SOLUTIONS ACT OF 2006 
Below, this Note begins to examine and delicately elucidate 
California's AB32, or the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, and 
its potential inspirations. Not intended to sequester the efficacy of 
the legislature from the rest of this piece, later sections _will touch 
on legislative power as well, but the following subsection focuses on 
the substantive power of the legislature when operating in tandem 
with the executive and the precedential ripples that can be created. 
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed Assembly Bill 32 
(AB32) into law in September of 2006. 57 Among other reforms and 
initiatives, in short, AB32 implemented a state program to 
curb greenhouse gas emissions from statewide sources.58 AB32 was 
partially foreshadowed by executive order S-3-05, 59 from Governor 
Schwarzenegger in 2005, that directed the California Air Resources 
Board to begin substantial initiatives to curb greenhouse 
55. See generally Alissa Scheller, 2 Degrees Will Change the World, MOTHER JONES 
(Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2015/11/2-degrees-will-change-
world-paris-climate-change (broadly examining the future risks of climate change). 
56. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (emphasis added). 
57. Office of the Governor, Governor Schwarzenegger Highlights California's 
Global Warming Accomplishments On Eve Of AB 32 Anniversary, Sept. 25, 2008, 
https://www.gov.ca.gov/news. php ?id= 10632. 
58. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 38500 (2006). 
59. See Mary D. Nichols, California's Climate Change Program: Lessons for the Nation, 
27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 185, 198 (2009) (summarizing AB32 and discussing national 
climate change needs). 
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gases statewide and set substantial targets. 60 The California Air 
Resources Board needed more authority to enact the Governor's 
executive order from the state legislature. 61 AB32 creates long-
lasting compliance plans that are still being monitored by the 
California Air Resources Board. 62 The timeline for AB32 extends to 
2020 and creates a deadline for greenhouse gas emissions caps;63 
one of the stated goals of AB32 is to return California's emission 
levels to where they were in 1990.64 
AB32 created an annual mandatory reporting requirement 
for emissions of greenhouse gases from private businesses. 65 AB32 
authorized imposition of non-compliance penalties from AB32.66 In 
addition, AB32 has provisions centered on creating a database at 
the governmental level of the largest producers and emitters of 
greenhouse gases, for better response and management from the 
67 
state government. 
Separate from reporting requirements, administrative reform, 
or creation of large-scale plans for greenhouse gas emissions, 
AB32 also ushered in new advisory and regulatory boards.68 The 
Environmental Advisory Justice Committee was created to meet 
with and advise the California Air Resources Board in 
long-term implementation of AB32. 69 In addition, an Economic 
and Technology Advancement Advisory Committee was 
created to further advise the board;70 the committee submitted its 
investigatory findings to the Board on how best to implement 
measures and developments from AB32 immediately.71 
Further, the California Air Resources Board pioneered a cap-
and-trade scheme with the Provincial Government of Quebec. 72 On 
January 1st, 2014, Quebec and California formally began 
their program to trade greenhouse gas emission allowances. 73 The 
60. Cal. Exec. Order S-3-05 (June 1, 2005), https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=l86l. 
61. See California Climate Change, California Climate Change Executive Orders 
(Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/state/executive_orders.html. 
62. Nichols, supra note 59, at 199--201. 
63. Id. at 200-01. 
64. See, CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY-AIR RESOURCES 
BOARD, Assembly Bill 32: An Overview, (last visited Oct. 20, 2017) 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm (describing AB32 generally). 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY§ 38580 (2006). 
68. See generally Nichols, supra note 59, at 198--202. 
69. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY§ 38591 (2006). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, California Cap and Trade, 13, 
(2014) https://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/key-legislation/california-cap-trade#Revenue 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2017). 
73. Id. 
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linkage program in 2015 saw a 2 percent decrease in emissions 
covered from the year before-California remains on track to reach 
1990 level emissions by 2020.74 The prominence and relative success 
of the program drew Ontario, Canada's most populous province, to 
join the cap-and-trade scheme with California and Quebec as well. 75 
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76 
Senate Bill 32 (SB32), passed in 2016, supplements AB32. 77 
SB32 codifies a proVIs10n of Governor Brown's B-30-15 
Executive Order. 78 With SB32 signed into law, by 2030 California's 
greenhouse gas emission levels must be 40 percent below 1990 levels 
and by 2050, 80 percent below.79 SB32 also grants the California Air 
Resources Board additional authority to promulgate more 
regulations in order to meet the new standards. 80 
In a testament to the majesty of well-functioning, traditional 
law-making, Governors Schwarzenegger and Brown worked with 
the California Legislature to implement the programs. State 
74. Id. at 6. See also infra note 76 and accompanying chart. 
75. See generally Allison Martell & Mike De Souza, Ontario Confirms it Will Join 
Quebec, California in Carbon Market REUTERS, Apr. 13, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-climatechange-canada-idUSKBNON41X220150413 (examining recent decision by 
Ontario to join cap-and-trade scheme). 
76. CLEAN OIL AND GAS FOUND., California Extends Climate Change Bill, Seeks 
40% Cut in GHGs Below 1990 Levels, http://cleanoilgasfoundation.org/california-clinate-
change.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2017). 
77. S.B. 32, 2015-16 Reg. Sess. (Cali. 2016). 
78. See Cal. Exec. Order No. B-30-15 (Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.gov. 
ca.gov/news.php?id=l8938; Richard Gonzalez, California Gov. Jerry Brown Signs New 
Climate Change Laws, NAT'L. PuB. RADIO (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.npr.org/ 
sections/thetwo-way/2016/09/08/ 493191842/california-gov-jerry-brown-signs-new-clima te-
change-laws. 
79. Cal. Exec. Order No. B-30-15. 
80. Id. 
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agency, executive, and legislature thrived in tandem to apply one of 
the nation's largest climate change initiatives seen to date.81 Indeed, 
as Professor Robert Stavins notes, "[t]his is a critical time for 
California's climate change policies." 82 These previous acts are 
wide-ranging bills setting regulatory standards until the year 2050, 
assuring the long-term stability of the plans enacted. It appears 
AB32 has garnered substantive results in fighting climate change. 
Perhaps there is merit to California Air and Resources Board 
Chairwoman, Mary Nichols', quote ''What the nation needs now is a 
federal Global Warming Solutions Act, modeled after California's 
efforts, and building off of the time-tested 'cooperative federalism' 
framework."83 
A. A Potential Product: The Global Warming 
Solutions Act of 2008 
As noted, Chairwoman Nichols implored the federal 
government to recreate the California Global Warming Solutions 
Act.84 Massachusetts, however, took the helm and instituted similar 
legislation. Democratic Governor Deval Patrick, and Republican 
Governor Charlie Baker each have taken proactive AB32-esque 
action. Without a doubt, the precedent shows bipartisanship works 
best to prompt state governments to address climate change. 
Governor Patrick signed Massachusetts' Global Warming 
Solutions Act (GWSA) into law in 2008.85 The GWSA requires that 
by "2020 statewide greenhouse gas emissions ... be between 10 per 
cent and 25 per cent below the 1990 emissions level."86 The GWSA 
sets a long-term goal of an 80% reduction by 2050, as well. Common 
sense dictates this gallant reform was, at least partially, inspired by 
AB32, even if in name only. At the time of signing, fans praised the 
GWSA for acting in the midst of uncertainty about the direction the 
nation would head in, 87 as the country was in the throes of the 2008 
81. See David Siders, This Is What The Climate Bill Jerry Brown Signed Means, THE 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 8, 2016, http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-
alert/articlel00734142.htm1. 
82. Robert N. Stavins, California Steps Forward on Climate but Emphasizes a Poor 
Policy Choice, 34 THE ENVTL. F. 2, 15 (2017). 
83. Nichols, supra note 59, at 212 (citation omitted). 
84. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
85. Michael P. Norton, Mass. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Down 21 Percent, THE LOWELL 
SUN, Apr. 4, 2017, http://www.lowellsun.com/breakingnews/ci_30897 427 /mass-greenhouse-
gas-emissions-down-21-percent. 
86. Global Warming Solutions Act, 2008 Mass. Legis. Serv. Ch. 298 (S.B. 2540) (2008). 
87. See generally Global Warming Solutions Act Passes Legislature, THE 
MARBLEHEAD REP., Aug. 1, 2008 http://marblehead.wickedlocal.com/x1566624572/Global-
Warming-Solutions-Act-passes-Legislature (discussing recent environmental legislation from 
the Massachusetts State Legislature). 
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Presidential Election when the bill was signed. 88 Advocates have 
opined this bold reform has put Massachusetts "at the head of the 
pack" in the fight against climate change.89 
Moving from legislative action mirroring California, Governor 
Baker's executive order seems starkly similar to Governor Brown's 
actions.90 In 2016, Governor Baker signed Executive Order 569.91 
Executive Order 569 directed the Governor's executive agencies to 
start taking substantial steps to individually address climate 
change. 92 Executive Order 569 mandated the administration to 
begin drafting adaptation plans across the Commonwealth. 93 It 
should be noted, drawing staunch parallels to Governor Brown, 
Baker doubled down support of the initial Global Warming 
Solutions Act of 2008, signed into law by his predecessor-of 
an opposite party. 94 Executive Order 569 mandates that the 
administration make sure it is in compliance and on track to meet 
the long term requirements of the GWSA.95 
The magnificence of AB32, it appears, is that it has created a 
ripple effect. California and Massachusetts stand as glistening 
examples of how climate change can be addressed across political 
lines. These two examples serve, more broadly, however, to 
illustrate the tools in the hands of statehouses to combat climate 
change. 
B. Precedent: Governor Rockefeller's Administration 
Governors Schwarzenegger and Brown's actions in fighting 
climate change in California were undoubtedly admirable and 
unique; yet, this is not to imply the two were the first governors to 
artfully implement environmental initiatives with the legislature's 
cooperation. Governor Nelson Rockefeller excelled, particularly, as 
88. Id. 
89. David Danielson, Finally, a Good Energy Policy, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 7, 2008), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/410570/finally-a-good-energy-policy/. 
90. See supra note 78--80 and accompanying text. 
91. Mass. Exec. Order. No. 569 (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/ 
executive-order-climate-change-strategy.pd£. 
92. Id. 
93. See Brook J. Detterman, Massachusetts Governor Baker Signs Executive Order 569 
On Climate Change, THE NAT'L L. REV., Oct. 24, 2016, http://www.natlawreview.com/ 
article/massachusetts-governor-baker-signs-executive-order-569-climate-change (examining 
Governor Baker's Executive Order 569's climate change efforts and affects). 
94. See generally Michael P. Norton & Andy Metzger, Baker Order Requires Climate 
Change Plan, THE TELEGRAM, Sept. 16, 2016, http://www.telegram.com/news/20160916/ 
baker-order-requires-climate-change-plan (broadly examining Executive Order 569 and 
climate change in Massachusetts). 
95. Detterman, supra note 93. 
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a statesman and environmentalist, through implementation of his 
initiatives and creation of long term precedent. 
Adirondack Park is a substantive part of the New York Forest 
Preserve,96 Governor Rockefeller's legislative efforts worked to set 
up a commission to find a way to properly administer conservation 
and environmental management efforts.97 Rockefeller spearheaded 
the creation of, and utilized his bully pulpit to lobby for, a bill he 
eventually signed it into law, the Adirondack Park Agency Act, 
which created a state agency to regulate the park properly 
with state resources.98 Rockefeller also worked to create, with the 
legislature, a unified state environmental agency,99 the New York 
Department of Environmental Conservation, one of the first of such 
measure and scope, in 1970.100 
Perhaps Rockefeller's greatest environmental legacy was 
creating what some call the inspiration for the Clean Water Act 
by introducing the Pure Waters Bond Act in 1965. 101 Rockefeller 
lobbied hard for it's passage, and exhausted himself working 
towards passing the Act. 102 The Pure Waters Bond Act touted it's 
goals as making waters "swimmable and fishable" and, in addition, 
worked to increase the efficacy and quantity of wastewater 
management systems across the state.103 The Pure Waters Bond Act 
still maintains a legacy of achieving environmental reform and 
cleaning up New York's waters. 104 Rockefeller has been heralded as 
an environmental trailblazer and noted for his precedent-setting 
96. See generally Peter Bauer, Governor Andrew Cuomo and the Boreas Ponds, 
ADIRONDACK ALMANACK (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.adirondackalmanack.com/2017/ 
03/governor-andrew-cuomo-and-the-boreas-ponds-part-1.html ( discussing New York's 
environmental state history). 
97. Charles Gottlieb, Regional Land Use Planning: A Collaborative Solution for the 
Conservation of Natural Resources, 29 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 35, 58--59 (2014). 
98. Stacey Lauren Stump, "Forever Wild" A Legislative Update on New York's 
Adirondack Park, 4 ALBANY Gov'T L. REV. 682, 698 (2011). 
99. Jeffrey Frank, Big Spender: Nelson Rockefeller's Grand Ambition, THE NEW 
YORKER, Oct. 13, 2014, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/13/big-spender-2. 
100. See Patricia E. Salkin, The Executive and the Environment: A Look at the Last Five 
Governors in New York, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 706, 708 (2014). 
101. James Tierney, Celebrating 50th of the Pure Waters Act, CLEAR WATERS, 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/105432.html. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Willie Janeway, Editorial, Gov. Cuomo's Proposed Budget Fails to Invest Enough 
in Clean Water, THE POST-STANDARD, Jan. 28, 2015, http://www.syracuse.com/opinion 
/index.ssf/2015/01/gov_cuomos_proposed_budget_fails_to_invest_in_clean_water_commentar 
y.html. 
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action. 105 A governor set the path for federal action in the absence of 
proper legislation, and undoubtedly, a governor, or governors could 
do it again. 
IV. MISCELLANEOUS LEGISLATIVE TOOLS 
The examples above are sterling efforts by state governments to 
address environmental issues facing states. Yet, state legislatures 
possess several more tools to pursue or advocate for an agenda of 
their choosing. Next, is a brief illustration of several well-known 
tools state legislatures have that could apply to climate change 
initiatives and give a few modern examples illustrating how 
legislatures use these powers. These serve to prove that while 
traditional lawmaking, cooperation between branches, has its 
merits, many tools remain in the hands of the legislatures. 
A. The Power of the Purse 
Previously, this Note enumerated a subset of state constitution 
prov1s10ns that mirror the Federal Constitution's dispersal 
of power amongst the branches. 106 Statehouses themselves are 
typically anointed with the "power of the purse." 107 Governor Tom 
Wolf refused to sign the funding package the Pennsylvania General 
Assembly sent to him in 2015, leading to a budget impasse and the 
state operating without a budget for 266 days. 108 As illustrated, 
governors without line-item vetoes, face the choice of complying 
with oft seen omnibus appropriations bills or opposing them 
entirely. Riders, or small provisions packaged within larger 
legislation, are sent along in these bills that give legislatures power 
over the governor. 109 The executive is more politically accountable 
and thus faces greater risks if it vetoes appropriations and a 
105. See Jeffrey Frank, Big Spender: Nelson Rockefeller's Grand Ambitions, THE NEW 
YORKER, Oct. 13, 2014, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/13/big-spender-2; 
Michael O'Donnell, Fortune's Son, THE NATION, Feb. 4, 2015, 
https://www.thenation.com/article/fortunes-son/. 
106. See supra Part II.B. 
107. Ronald Snell, The Power of the Purse: Legislatures That Write State Budgets 
Independently of the Governor, NAT'L. COUNCIL OF ST. LEGISLATURES, Mar. 2008, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/the-power-of-the-purse-legislatures-that-write-
st.aspx. 
108. See Maria Panaritis & Kathy Boccella, Ending Budget Impasse, Wolf Says: 'We Need 
to Move on', THE PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 24, 2016, http://www.philly.com/philly/ 
news/20160324_ Wolf_relents_on_budget_ends_historic_impasse.html (explanation of the 
2015 Pennsylvania Budget discord and resolution). 
109. See Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the Altar of 
Appropriations Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457 (1997); 
Brandon F. Denning & Brooks R. Smith, Uneasy Riders: The Case for A Truth-in-Legislation 
Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 957, 959---64 (1999). 
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government shutdown results. Omnibus riders are an invaluable 
tool in the hands of the state legislatures and could be used to 
implement conservation or environmental plans. 
B. Censure and Impeachment 
The impeachment and censure tools are one of the few methods 
the legislature has to grab headlines and attention statewide for a 
cause important to them at a level comparable to the state 
executive. 11° Further, impeachment and censure require little 
cooperation from other branches of government. 111 Wallace Hall was 
a member of the Texas Board of Regents, the governing body for the 
State University System of Texas. 112 In 2013, the Texas Legislature 
censured Regent Hall for "misconduct, incompetency in the 
performance of official duties, or behavior unbefitting [of a 
regent].',1 13 Impeachment and censure are often relegated to the 
annals of history and not frequently used at the federal level, 114 the 
previous example served to illustrate state legislatures are still very 
capable of censure and impeachment. A state legislature, if held by 
ardent environmental activists, could censure or impeach a head of 
the state environmental agency, if the head refused to address 
climate change or environmental issues to the legislatures liking. 
C. Redistricting 
Common sense dictates that the political fruit of redistricting or 
gerrymandering are long-term investments. The demand for 
immediate climate change action is strong, so does redistricting 
deserve a place in the pantheon of tools state legislatures have? 
State legislatures still retain the ability to draw maps more 
sympathetic to their causes. 115 Some, not all, state legislatures hold 
the sole power to redistrict and apportion state and federal district 
110. See generally John Nichols, Censure and Impeachment, THE NATION, July 23, 2007, 
https://www.thenation.com/article/censure-and-impeachment/ (general analysis of 
impeachment power). 
lll. Id. 
ll2. See Ralph K.M. Haurwitz, Panel Censures UT Regent Wallace L. Hall Jr., THE 
AUSTIN-AMERICAN STATESMAN (Aug. ll, 2014), http://www.statesman.com/news/state--
regional-govt--po1itics/panel-censures-regent-wallace-hall/dTKKhqoALaXjN90qb60nBM/ 
(discussion of Regent Hall impeachment scandal). 
ll3. Id. 
ll4. See generally Bill Schnieder, A Historical Tutorial on Impeachment, CNN 
(Mar. ll, 1998), http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/03/ll/impeachment.censure/ 
(broad examination of history of impeachment power in America). 
ll5. See Christopher Ingraham, This is the Best Explanation of Gerrymandering You 
Will Ever See, THE WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
wonk/wp/2015/03/01/this-is-the-best-explanation-of-gerrymandering-you-will-ever-see/ 
(explaining redistricting and Gerrymandering). 
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boundaries. 116 If these legislatures partake in gerrymandering 
practices, they have the.capability to ensure districts are shaped to 
their liking, and to their potential political or policy inclinations. 117 
I 
D. Joint Resolutions 
Legislatures can also make broad statements, announce 
resolutions, and initiate symbolic gesturing-akin to the executive's 
use of press releases or utilization of state and national media 
outlets--often utilized by Joint Resolutions. 118 Utah State Senator 
Jim Dabakis introduced Senate Joint Resolution 9 (S.J.R.9), or the 
Joint Resolution on Climate Change in February of 2017. 119 S.J.R.9 
is a statement of the legislature's intent to address climate change 
and its interest in better understanding the causes of climate 
120 
change. 
Whereas, if left unaddressed, the consequences of a changing 
climate have the potential to: 
• [A]dversely impact all Americans; 
• [A]ffect vulnerable populations the hardest; 
• [H]arm productivity in key economic sectors such as 
construction, agriculture, and tourism; 
• [S]addle future generations with costly economic and 
environmental burdens; and 
• [l]mpose additional costs on state and federal budgets 
that will further add to the long-term fiscal challenges 
that we face as a state and nation. 121 
The introduction of S.J.R.9 is a marked reversal from the 
previously passed House Joint Resolution 12 (H.J.R.12), adopted in 
2010, which implored the EPA to reverse its current course of 
regulations on carbon dioxide reduction. 122 The utilization of a joint 
resolution to call attention to issues the legislature determines at 
116. See Christopher Ingraham, This is Actually What America Would Look Like Without 
Gerrymandering, THE WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
wonk/wp/2016/01/13/this-is-actually-what-america-would-look-like-without-
gerrymandering/ (illustrating non-Gerrymander-ed districts). 
117. Redistricting, THE NAT'L COUNCIL OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/redistricting.aspx. 
118. The Legislative Process, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
http://www.house.gov/content/learn/legislative_process/. 
119. S.J. Res. 9 Joint Resolution on Climate Change, Utah State. Legis. Reg. Sess. 
(2017). 
120. See id. 
121. Id. 
122. H.R.J. Res. 12, Climate Change Joint Resolution, Utah State Legis. Reg. Sess. 
(2010). 
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their discretion is a perceptive and resourceful tool the state 
legislatures have at their disposal. 
V. THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE AND THE 
MIDWESTERN GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION ACCORD 
Below, this Note emphasizes two notable pacts between states 
led by governors. The listed examples are glistening demonstrations 
of the power a governor has. However, the Interstate Compact 
Clause limits the executive's agreement power. 123 The Supreme 
Court iterated in Virginia v. Tennessee, that not all agreements from 
states are subject by the bar established by the Interstate Compact 
Clause. 124 Later in the case, the Supreme Court noted that states 
may not enter into agreements that run afoul of the powers 
of the federal government. 125 As environmental and climate change 
regulation is soundly within the realm of dual sovereignty, which 
was examined earlier, interstate climate change agreements should 
be protected from vulnerability in regards to this clause, especially 
with the following two examples as precedent. However, this ought 
to implore governors to proceed warily and try not to tread on any 
authority or power so outside the realm of environmental and 
climate change precedent it encroaches on the Virginia limits and 
begins to lead to the "increase of political power in the states[;]" 
thus, encroaching "upon or interfere[ing] with the just supremacy of 
the United States."126 
A. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
In 2003, a bipartisan group of northeastern governors began 
joint talks and information sessions that culminated with the 
creation and individual approval of the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGl). 127 In 2005, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Delaware, 
New York, Vermont, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
Maryland, and Massachusetts began the program to implement a 
cap-and-trade scheme, and to focus on carbon dioxide emissions, 
among power plants within their states. 128 The RGGI was created 
largely in conformity with existing cap-and-trade frameworks; 
123. U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 3. 
124. 148 U.S. 503, at 518-521 (1893). 
125. Id. at 519. 
126. Id. 
127. Note, The Compact Clause and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 120 HARV. 
L. REV. 1958, 1959-60 (2007). 
128. Lauren E. Schmidt & Geoffrey M. Williamson, Recent Developments in Climate 
Change Law, 37 COLO. LAW. 63, 70 (2008). 
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however, the program does not span the entire economies of each 
individual state, but focuses specifically on the energy sector. 129 
This particular climate change program was born from the capacity 
the state executive has to barter, negotiate, and exercise political 
capital and function as a dignitary for the state to implement and 
enter agreements above the state level. 130 
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131 
The RGGI is still functioning today and has produced positive 
results in reducing carbon dioxide emissions while also saving 
consumers millions. 132 New Jersey left the agreement in 2012, but 
a movement at the state level has developed advocating rejoining 
after several companies reported economic losses. 133 A 40% decrease 
in power sector carbon dioxide emissions has been reported since 
the RGGI's implementation in 2005. 134 
129. Robert Zeinemann, Emerging Practice Area: The Regulation of Greenhouse Gases, 
82 WIS. LAW, 6, 8 (2009). 
130. See generally Commentary, supra note 127, at 1958. 
131. Silvio Marcacci, RGGI Carbon Market Invests $1 Billion in Clean Energy, CLEAN 
TECHNICA, Apr. 22, 2015, https://cleantechnica.com/2015/04/22/rggi-carbon-market-invests-1-
billion-clean-energy/. 
132. Committee Report, Report of the Climate Change & Emissions Committee, 31 
ENERGY L.J. 571, 594--95 (2010). 
133. FACT SHEET, ACADIA CENTER, ENTER, NEW JERSEY AND RGGI: POTENTIAL BENEFITS 
OF RENEWED PARTICIPATION, http://acadiacenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/09/Acadia 
Center_RGGI_NJ_FactSheet_032415.pclf. 
134. Report, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, INC., RGGI REPORT: INVESTMENTS PROVIDE 
$2.9 BILLION IN ENERGY BILL SAVINGS; 3.7 MILLION PARTICIPATING HOUSEHOLDS BENEFIT, 
(Apr. 21,2015), http://www.rggi.org/docs/ProceedsReport/2013Proceeds%20Report_PR _Final.pdf. 
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B. Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord 
The Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord was created 
as an agreement between six midwestern governors and the 
Premier of Manitoba. 135 Each of the individual states have large 
agri-business sectors and are susceptible to climate change-induced 
disaster. 136 The Accord set up a blueprint for a multi-sector cap-and-
trade system in the region, and various other mitigation efforts. 137 
The Accord produced the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction 
Program, the formal write-up of the cap-and-trade program. 138 The 
Program included goals for curbing greenhouse gas emissions, and 
discussed a potential cap-and-trade program, the management and 
tracking of emissions, and regional incentives for implementing the 
programs. 139 
The Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord remains a 
high-profile verification of what can be done to combat climate 
change with willing state executives. While no sweeping action has 
been taken in the various statehouses of Accord members, and the 
current executives are not pursuing it, 140 the Accord put together an 
extensive study of how to implement regionally specialized 
climate change mitigation programs. 141 Should executives of any 
participating member-state seek to immediately take steps on 
climate change, expensive studies and delays to develop plans are 
not necessary, the Accord provides an on-demand blueprint. 
VI. THE MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF ENTERPRISE SUSTAINABILITY 
Administrative officers at the state level are employed at the 
pleasure of the Governor and the Governor, vested with executive 
authority, exercises mass influence over the organization of 
agencies and the substantive manner the agencies operate. This has 
proven true at the federal level and can function at the state level. 
135. Erin Benoy, Note, Wanted: Farmer-Friendly Climate Change Legislation, 16 DRAKE 
J. AGRIC. L. 147, 150 (2011). 
136. Id. at 154. 
137. Id. 
138. See Press Release, Cal. Office of the Governor, Governor Schwarzenegger Applauds 
Nine Midwest States For Creating Regional Climate Partnership (Nov. 15, 2007), 
https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=8109. 
139. Id. 
140. Maria Gallucci, Cap and Trade Resurrected? Some States Awaken to Its Economic 
Benefits, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (July 12, 2012) https://insideclimatenews.org/ 
news/20120708/cap-and-trade-rgg-states-california-economic-benefits-energy-efficiency-jobs-
carbon-auctions-proceeds-deficits. 
141. See Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY 
SOLUTIONS, https://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/regiona1-climate-initiatives/mggra. (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2017). 
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For example, President Clinton's Executive Order 12898 set up 
"I t W k. G E · 1 J · " 142 an n eragency or 1ng roup on nvironmenta ustice. 
Essentially, this group served as a watchdog organization spanning 
the majority of the executive branch and working with each agency 
to advance the goals of environmental justice pursuant to 
the governor's policy preferences and agenda. 143 Below a hefty 
illustration takes place of the steps the Governor of Minnesota has 
already begun to take, utilizing similar methodology to the one that 
President Clinton employed. 
In 2016, Minnesota Governor Mark Dayton created the Office 
of Enterprise Sustainability (OES). 144 The OES is a watchdog 
accountability organization that monitors and works with the 
existing executive agencies in Minnesota. 145 Lieutenant Governor 
Tina Smith proclaimed, regarding Minnesota's climate change 
actions, "State government has many opportunities to fight climate 
change-by ensuring buildings are energy efficient, increasing our 
reliance on renewable energies, choosing more fuel-efficient fleet 
h . 1 d ki ·_J! d h . d . . " 146 ve 1c es, an ma ng more 111.iorme pure as1ng ec1s10ns. 
Dayton's creation of OES was an effort to take immediate mitigation 
steps within his own administration. 
OES will provide agencies with the assistance needed to: 
• Reduce greenhouse gas emissions and water usage, 
• Increase energy efficiency and recycling, and 
• Support better coordination of sustainability efforts across 
state government. 
• Develop sustainability plans to reduce costs associated with 
operations while improving Minnesota's environment. 147 
OES celebrated its first anniversary in August of 2017. 148 Before 
the creation of OES, the Dayton Administration released a 
substantive report, titled "Climate Solutions and Economic 
Opportunities." 149 The report includes a brief manifesto of stated 
goals and explanations of what can be done to tackle climate 
142. Exec. Order No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
143. See generally id. 
144. Press Release, Minn. Office of the Governor, Minnesota Establishes New Office 
of Enterprise Sustainability to Fight Climate Change (July 20, 2016), http://mn.gov/ 
governor/newsroom/?id= 1055-249987. 
145. See id. 
146. Id. 
147. MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, Office of Enterprise Sustainability, 
http://mn.gov/admin/government/sustainability/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2017). 
148. Id. 
149. MINNESOTA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY BOARD, Climate Solutions and Economic 
Strategies: A Foundation for Minnesota's State Climate Action Planning (2016). 
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change. 150 Direction and exercising of executive authority over state 
agencies to implement climate change is one of the easiest steps to 
be taken by the state executive to enact reform. 151 
VII. WASHINGTON STATE'S CARBON TAX 
As touched on earlier, statehouses hold many of the same 
abilities as the federal government to make law regarding their 
province. 152 Laying and collecting taxes is one of the federal 
government's most obvious and infamous roles. 153 This ability is, of 
course, extended to the states as well. 154 Washington State's failed 
2016 carbon-tax initiative, also known as 1-732, serves as a staid 
example of carbon taxes as a method for states to combat climate 
change. 
British Columbia's successful implementation of a carbon tax 
program served as the inspiration for the Washington carbon tax 
initiative. 155 If the measure had been successful starting on July 1, 
2017, a tax rate, increasingly yearly, would have been placed 
on metric tons of carbon used. 156 Carbon WA, a Washington activist 
organization, sparked interest by garnering over 360,000 signatures 
on a petition, 157 without Democratic Governor, and noted climate 
change activist, 158 Jay lnslee's support, the initiative was sent to the 
ballots during the 2016 election cycle. 159 
The initiative suffered setbacks early on, with criticisms coming 
from varied sides of the political aisles. 160 Some environmentalists 
argued it did too little and harmed minority or impoverished 
communities, 161 while other opponents derided it's very nature, 
being an increased revenue collection method, anointed with "the 
150. Id. at 3. 
151. MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, supra note 147. 
152. See supra Part II, B, 2. 
153. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8. 
154. See Kathryn L. Moore, State and Local Taxation: When Will Congress Intervene?, 
23 J. LEGIS. 171 (1997). 
155. Cassandra Profita, A Carbon Tax In Oregon?, OR. PUB. BROAD., Jan. 8, 2013, 
http://www.opb.org/news/blog/ecotrope/a-carbon-tax-in-oregon/. 
156. Ferdinand Hogroian, 2016 Election Roundup, 26-FEB. J. MULTISTATE TAX'N 27, 
2017 WL 117867. 
157. Shi-Ling Hsu, Environmentalists' Disdain for Washington's Carbon Tax, 
SLATE (Oct. 16, 2016) http://www.slate.corn/articles/health_and_science/science/2016/10/ 
environmentalists_are_against_i_ 7 32_ washington_s_carbon_tax.html. 
158. Marianne LaVelle, Washington State Voters Reject Nation's First Carbon 
Tax, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS, (Nov. 9, 2016), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/ 
09112016/washington-state-carbon-tax-i-732-ballot-measure. 
159. Id. 
160. See generally Hsu, supra note 157. 
161. William Yardley, How A Tax On Carbon Has Divided Northwest Climate 
Activists, THE L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-sej-carbon-tax-
washington-20161011-sna p-story .html. 
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dreaded word 'tax."' 162 The Sierra Club, markedly, declined to 
endorse the initiative, alongside several other noteworthy activist 
organizations. 163 Truly, the infighting between environmentalists 
became well-known, and led to a Seattle Times Columnist calling it 
"a liberal pig pile." 164 
The election eventually came and I-732 failed by a 59%-41% 
margin. 165 The valiant effort remains the highest profile carbon tax 
initiative our nation has seen. 166 Through this example, lessons can 
be learned for other states; perhaps calling the potential programs 
a "price adjustment" or "fee implementation" to avoid labeling 
the carbon tax initiative with, the "t-word." 167 In addition, 
environmentalists ought to stress that cannibalizing the efforts 
from within will only serve to hinder the cause, long-run. Yet, 
despite all its problems, I-732 is a strong example of how states hold 
the quasi-dormant ability to take the mantle in the fight against 
climate change. Carbon taxes can originate from statehouses and be 
signed into law without a plebiscite in some states, while others may 
opt to place it on a ballot for a referendum. Regardless, states have 
significant power and precedent in carbon tax initiatives. 
A. Influences and Precedents 
While I-732 serves as the most recent and perhaps most well-
known carbon tax initiative, it would be a disservice to not include 
several trailblazers. While British Columbia's carbon tax is the most 
notable, successfully passed initiative, it is necessary to include 
Vermont's and Oregon's attempts for implementation of carbon 
taxes. Not only did these three initiatives form precedent for states 
wishing to implement carbon taxes, they serve to prove that the 
issue of carbon taxation can leave the borders of Washington State. 
Hefty and intricate analysis of these plans may not be necessary, 
but some examination and explanation of their role, moving 
forward, as precedent, warrant examination. 
162. Hsu, supra note 157. 
163. La Yelle, supra note 158. 
164. Danny Westneat, Audubon Backs I-732 To Fight Climate Change-It's Better Than 
Nothing, THE SEATILE TIMES, July, 13, 2016, http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/audubon-backs-i-732-its-better-than-nothing/. 
165. Matthew C. Boch, A Green Headache? Thinking About The Practical Implications 
Of A State Carbon Tax, 26-FEB J. MULTISTATE TAX'N 35, 2017 WL 117870, 1. 
166. Id. 
167. Hsu, supra note 157. 
172 JOURNAL OF LAND USE [Vol. 33:1 
1. British Columbia 
In February of 2008, British Columbia announced it would 
introduce and implement a carbon tax initiative. 168 The initiative 
drew fire and praise from the usual parties, some environmental 
activists showing support and some opposing industrialists 
levying criticisms. 169 While British Columbia's carbon tax met some 
hiccups, generally the program is viewed as a success, "[o]verall, 
[British Columbia]'s carbon tax has still returned more in reduced 
taxes to B.C. households and businesses than it has taken in-and 
will do so in the future." 170 The carbon tax proved so inspirational, 
the very columnist who described the 1-732 as a "liberal pig pile," 
also credited British Columbia's carbon tax as a model for 1-732. 171 
Internationally, the United Nations and the World Bank have each 
praised the British carbon tax plan. 172 While some domestic dissent 
remains, and debate about the figures and results remain lively, the 
program is a steadfast example of a successful climate change 
initiative, and a carbon tax plan, taken at the state, or in this case, 
provincial, level. 
2. Oregon 
Rumblings of an Oregonian statewide climate change initiative 
began in 2009, but the pressures of the economic recession 
and varying intimating political waves sank the movement. 173 
Later on, in 2014, the Legislature proposed a significantly 
more comprehensive and thorough carbon plan. 174 The Oregon 
Legislature's carbon tax plan was thorough to say the least, 
exemptions for certain classes of taxpayers were carved out, a 
study was commissioned, and hefty debate was held. 175 The study 
reported that the program, if implemented, would have 
168. David G. Duff, Carbon Taxation in British Columbia, 10 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 87, 101 
(2008). 
169. Id. 
170. Mark Cameron, The Real Lesson Ontario Can Take Away from B. C. 'S Carbon Tax, 
MACLEAN'S. (Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.macleans.ca/economy/economicanalysis/the-real-
lesson-ontario-can-take-away-from-b-c-s-carbon-tax/. 
171. Westneat, supra note 164. 
172. Mark Hume, B.C. Carbon Tax: An Effective Model For National Climate 
Change Approach, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Dec. 10, 2014, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/ 
news/british-columbia/bcs-carbon-tax-effective-in-reducing-greenhouse-gas-emissions-
report/article22017313/. 
173. Scott Learn, Can Oregon's Climate Change Plan Survive A Down Economy?, 
THE OREGONIAN, Jan. 17, 2009, http://www.oregonlive.com/environmenUindex.ssf/2009/ 
01/can_oregons_climate_change_pla.html. 
174. Nancy Shurtz, Carbon Pricing Initiatives in Western North America: Blueprint for 
Global Climate Change Policy, 7 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 61, 123 (2016). 
175. Id. 
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dramatically reduced greenhouse gas emissions, while avoiding 
h · h 176 b 177 armmg t e economy. Regretta ly, the plan never passed. Yet, 
it can be inferred, that Oregon's neighbor to the North was not 
oblivious to the movement and likely looked to the precedent Oregon 
set. Oregon played a vital role in garnering momentum, one-by-one 
carbon tax plans seem to be popping up at the state level, these 
rumblings are significant and may eventually lead to a substantive 
carbon tax; however, one thing is certain, they have ample authority 
and precedent to back them up. 
3. Vermont 
Vermont also took the carbon tax battle by the horns through 
House Bill 412 (HB412). 178 The 2015 bill ultimately met its demise 
· · 
179 h 1·k O V ' f£ "d 1n committee, yet, muc 1 e regon, ermont s e ort prov1 es a 
blueprint and political momentum for further state initiatives. The 
bill brought discussion to carbon taxation and climate 
change initiatives to Vermont. 180 Vermont's climate change 
measure, developed as 2015 was waning, undoubtedly influenced or, 
at the least, was discussed by Washington's carbon tax activists 
during the public debate ofl-732. 
VIII. INFORMATION-GENERATING ORGANIZATIONS 
States possess the ability to gather more concise, more relevant 
to local issues, assemblies to address pertinent issues in climate 
change or environmental policy. Climate change and even some 
environmental policy still carries a stigma amongst some political 
actors. 181 The information-finders listed below, present and gather 
information usually unique to their individual state to present to 
the executive or legislature. These groups usually present 
information in a vacuum off of the national stage. These assemblies, 
consisting either of private citizens or public state actors, 
can exercise significant clout by advising the governor 
176. Wendy Culverwell, The Cost Of Carbon: Tax Would Be '.A Small Drag' On 
Oregon Economy, THE PORTLAND Bus. J., Dec. 8, 2014, http://www.bizjournals.com/ 
portland/blog/sbo/2014/12/the-cost-of-carbon-tax-would-be-a-small-drag-on.html. 
177. Shurtz, supra note 17 4, at 123. 
178. H. 412, 2015-16 Gen. Assemb., Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2015). 
179. Id. 
180. Peter Hirschfeld, Vermont GOP Targets Democrats in New 'Stop The Carbon Tax' 
Attack Ad, VERMONT PUB. RADIO, (Aug. 17, 2016), http://digital.vpr.net/post/vermont-gop-
targets-democrats-new-stop-carbon-tax-attack-ad#stream/0. 
181. Fuller, supra note 31. 
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and recommending changes. 182 Yet, the common thread running 
between them is their substantive ability to gather information and 
produce research on and study the varied needs facing states. 
A. Legislative Committees 
Federal congressional committees usually control the fate of any 
given bill within their jurisdiction; they can issue subpoenas, hold 
hearings, compel witnesses to produce data, and hold parties in 
contempt. 183 Yet what can be done on the state level through these 
committees? The following section works to elucidate the capacities 
and abilities of these committees. Several state legislatures have 
taken action to create legislative committees or commissions solely 
addressed to climate change causes. 
Alaska State Representative Andy Josephson introduced House 
Bill 173 (HBl 73), an attempt to codify the progress made through 
the Alaskan Climate Change Sub-Cabinet that Governor Palin had 
organized, in the form of a seriarately molded committee to monitor 
and address climate change. 84 The sub-cabinet, as common sense 
dictates, can be called or dismissed at the pleasure of 
the Governor. 185 HBl 73 attempts to distinctly codify and fund a 
commission addressed to climate change is a utilization of the 
legislatures tools to address climate change. 186 
The North Carolina Legislature organized a Legislative 
Commission on Global Climate Change in 2005. 187 The Commission 
was to conduct an in-depth examination and study of the nature of 
climate change, the danger it presents to North Carolina, 
and will make recommendations and publish its findings. 188 The 
Commission was not meant to be a standing committee, but to 
publish research and adopt findings; thus, after several extensions, 
the Commission dissolved. 189 The Bill creating the Commission was 
signed into law by Governor Easley; should an opposing party have 
taken power, the Commission would still have remained in 
existence. 190 
182. Governors' Use of Cabinets, NATIONAL GoVERNORS AsSOCIATION 1, 11-13 
(Oct. 26, 2006), https://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/06GOVCABINT.PDF. 
183. See generally The Role of Committees in the Legislative Process, THE UNITED STATES 
SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/general/Features/Committees.htm. 
184. See Alaska Legislative Assembly, An Act establishing the Alaska Climate Change 
Response Commission, H.R. 173 Alaska Legis. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Mar. 10, 2017). 
185. See Governors' Use of Cabinets, supra note 182, at 11-13. 
186. Id. 
187. 2005 N.C. Session L. 442 ("An Act to Establish the Legislative Commission on 
Global Climate Change"). 
188. See id. 
189. Id. §11. 
190. Id. 
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California and Massachusetts each organized within their state 
legislatures committees dedicated to addressing climate change. 
These committees, an exercise in legislative power and autonomy, 
hold massive power within their own states. The Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts organized a House and Senate Committee on Global 
Warming and Climate Change. 
It shall be the duty of the House Committee on Global 
Warming and Climate Change to consider all matters related 
to the Commonwealth's climate policy, including but not 
limited to greenhouse gas emissions, the climate impacts of 
renewable energy development and climate change 
adaptation and mitigation. The committee shall also serve in 
an advisory capacity to other joint committees that consider 
legislation with significant climate impacts, including but 
not limited to environment, natural resources and , 
agriculture, transportation, energy, housing and economic 
development and emerging technologies. The committee may 
participate with other committees in joint hearings at the 
request of the Speaker or by agreement of the committee 
chairs. 191 
Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker recently signed an 
executive order attempting to begin curbing greenhouse gas 
emissions within th~ commonwealth. 192 Baker had the findings or 
resources of the committees at the state government's disposal as 
well to aid his drafting of the executive order. The committees 
provide more research and resources than would be normally 
available otherwise. 
The California State Assembly created a standing Joint 
Legislative Committee on Climate Change Policies that has been 
relatively active in state climate change action. 193 While legislative 
commissions wield substantial authority and power, they also hold 
a great deal of discretion to exercise that authority and power. 194 
California's Climate Change Committee stated from its inception it 
seeks to take an active role in making findings and ascertaining 
facts related to climate change. 195 
191. HOUSE COMMI'ITEE ON GLOBAL WARMING AND CLIMATE CHANGE, 
https://malegislature.gov/Committees/Detail/H51/About (last accessed Mar. 13, 2017). 
192. Mass. Exec. Order No. 569 (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.mass.gov/governor/ 
legislationexecorder/execorders/executive-order-no-569.html. 
193. See CALIFORNIA STATE AsSEMBLY, JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMI'ITEE ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, POLICIES, http://assembly.ca.gov/climatechangepolicies (last visited Oct. 20, 2017). 
194. See generally, United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (discussing 
prosecutorial discretion). 
195. Cal. Gov't. Code §9147.10 (2016). 
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The Joint Legislative Committee on Climate Change 
Policies is hereby created. The committee shall ascertain 
facts and make recommendations to the Legislature 
concerning the state's programs, policies, and investments 
related to climate change. Those recommendations shall be 
shared with other appropriate legislative standing 
committees, including the Assembly Committee on Budget 
and the Senate Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review. 196 
I assert these specialized climate change committees provide 
resources, funds, and attention to a totally unique and demanding 
field of legislation and hold an enviable vantage point. Their 
importance cannot be understated. These committees give 
legislatures a seat at the table in regards to power to enact climate 
change legislation. 
B. Sub-cabinets, Commissions, and Advisory Groups 
These assemblies, sub-cabinets, commissions, or advisory 
groups, wield significant influence and have varied power and 
influence. These committees, as demonstrated below, can be 
organized by the executive or can be created by legislature and 
signed into law by the executive, thus granting the resources the 
legislature can give. The discussion and analysis includes a brief, 
selected subset, not an absolute listing of state initiatives to create 
information-gathering organizations. 
Montana Governor Steve Bullock assembled an interim Clean 
Power Advisory Group from various state actors and citizens to 
advise the Montana Department of Environmental Quality. 197 The 
Council's purpose was a one-time submission of recommendation to 
the executive's environmental agency regarding clean power options 
in Montana. 198 The governor, here, assembled experts in the field to 
help take informed action combating climate change in Montana. 
In 2005, Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano signed an executive 
order creating the Climate Change Advisory Group. 199 Napolitano 
assembled thirty five individuals to form a team to advise her 
administration on how to address greenhouse gas emissions and 
196. Id. 
197. See Press Release, Mont. Office of the Governor, Governor Steve Bullock Announces 
Interim Clean Power Plan Advisory Council Members, https://governor.mt.gov/Newsroom/ 
Governor-Steve-Bullock-Announces-Interim-Clean-Power-Plan-Advisory-Council-Members. 
198. Id. 
199. Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2005-02 (Mar. 20, 2017), http://azmemory.azlibrary.gov/ 
cdm/ref/collection/execorders/id/ 465. 
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to create a long-term plan to curb emissions in Arizona. 200 The 
executive order emphasized keeping jobs and natural resources 
preserved while doing everything possible to address Gases.201 The 
Group also was to take inventory of Arizona's current greenhouse 
· · 202 gas em1ss10ns. 
Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich assembled the Illinois Climate 
Change Advisory Group through Executive Order. 203 Similar to 
other groups mentioned, the Committee was to gather research and 
present the executive with a climate change plan he could enact.204 
The executive order also mandated the Illinois Environmental 
Protection Agency to submit an annual report tracking fseenhouse 
gas emissions across the state and forecast new trends.2 5 
In 2007, Governor Sarah Palin signed an administrative 
order creating the Alaska Climate Change Sub-Cabinet.206 The Sub-
Cabinet was dedicated to creating a climate change plan for Alaska 
and publishing a high-profile plan for mitigation of risks. 207 The 
Sub-cabinet was solely organized under the role of the executive. 208 
These commissions or committees have vast power. They can 
attempt fact-finding missions; draw attention to issues; maneuver 
more flexibly than the governor across the state and communicate 
with various actors; they can bring in varied voices from across the 
spectrum; and finally, they can assess the needs of the state and 
make findings in a manner political actors cannot.209 Commissions 
and advisory groups are not merely figurehead displays; they have 
unique abilities and can achieve real results. 
IX. RECENT ACTION 
By most metrics, it can be noted that the Trump Administration 
has moved resoundingly fast in instituting reform within the 
regulatory state.210 In addition, the President has withdrawn from 
200. Id. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. Ill. Exec. Order No. 2006-11 (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www2.illinois.gov/Pages/ 
government/execorders/2016_1 l.aspx. 
204. See id. 
205. Id. 
206. Alaska Admin. Order No. 238 (Mar. 13, 2017), https://gov.alaska.gov/admin-
orders/238.html. 
207. Id. 
208. Rick Steiner, Gov. Parnell Must Revive Alaska Climate Change Cabinet, ALAsKA 
DISPATCH NEWS, Mar. 7, 2013, https://www.adn.com/commentary/article/gov-parnell-must-
revive-alaska-climate-change-cabinet/2013/03/08/. 
209 See generally The Role of Committees in the Legislative Process, supra note 183. 
210. Chris Cillizza, President Trump Likes To Move Fast. The Public Isn't Thrilled., 
WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/03/the-
trump-administration-is-very-proud-of-how-fast-its-moving-the-public-is-less-
178 JOURNAL OF LAND USE [Vol. 33:1 
the Paris Climate Accord, sparking passionate responses on both 
sides of the aisles. Below, responses from state actors advocating for 
climate change policy already seen in the Trump Administration are 
included. 
A. The Paris Climate Accord 
Even in the lead-up to President Trump withdrawing from the 
Paris Climate Accord, governors, other state actors, and even large 
companies were putting pressure on the President to 
reconsider withdrawal and making preliminary plans should the 
Administration do so. 211 Nonetheless, the attempts to lobby the 
President were unsuccessful and in the wake of the announcement, 
pacts and groups began to form amongst state actors. 212 The U.S. 
Climate Alliance (USCA) was launched immediately after the White 
House made the announcement.213 A state-led group materialized 
before the President's eyes as governors pledged their commitments 
to the principles of the Paris Climate Accord and vowed their 
membership to the USCA.214 USCA's stated goals mirror the Paris 
Climate Accord; members vow to reduce emissions from 26-28%.215 
While primarily populated by Democratic governors, the USCA 
boasts Republican Governors Charlie Baker of Massachusetts, and 
Phil Scott of Vermont as well. 216 
In response, the White House seemed uncharacteristically 
complacent in regards to this step. As demonstrated by White House 
Press Secretary Sean Spicer statement that, 
If a mayor or a governor wants to enact a policy on a 
range of issues, they are accountable to their own voters, and 
that's what they should do. We believe in states' rights, so if 
thrilled/?utm_term=.a903155dac3e; Richard Pierce, Is Trump Moving Too Fast? Checks and 
Balances Will Slow Him Down, THE HILL, (Feb. 12, 2017), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-
blog/the-administration/319083-is-trum p-moving-too-fast-checks-and-balances-will-slow. 
211. See Marianne Lavelle, Climate Action Will Thrive on State and Local Level, Leaders 
Vow After Trump Order, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Mar. 29, 2017), https://insideclimatenews. 
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a locality, a municipality or a state wants to enact a policy, 
that their voters or American citizens believe in, then that's 
217 
what they should do. 
179 
From the statement alone it appears the Trump Administration 
goes as far as to give validation to the USCA, as long as it's the will 
of member states' constituents. 
Perhaps most curious is the response on the city and 
municipality level. Beyond the statehouses, U.S. mayors reacted 
strongly to the President's actions regarding the Climate Accord and 
vowed that they would step up the fight through action in their 
respective city halls. 218 The Mayors of Chicago and Boston have 
b bl . . h . 219 I . 1 een nota y pass10nate m t eir responses. n an act seeming y 
mirroring the USCA, 365 Mayors across the nation have founded an 
organization, nicknamed "The Climate Mayors," or the "Mayors 
National Climate Action Agenda."220 These Mayors have vowed to 
take steps to fight climate change and created new goals and 
deadlines to reduce their emissions, and appear to be working in 
tandem with a similar effort through the Governor's USCA. Though, 
it should be noted, Mayoral action was included for thoroughness of 
explanation and bears little resounding consequence of federalist 
action in climate change. 
B. The Clean Power Plan 
The Trump Administration's only foray in to the climate change 
arena was not solely the Paris Climate Accord. The Trump 
Administration has released a slew of memoranda, notices, policy 
shifts, and drafts all working to adjust the previous 
Administration's climate policy.221 The Executive Order instructing 
the EPA to begin review or revision of the Clean Power Plan, 
however, drew significant drawback from State Actors. Indeed, 
much like the decision to abandon the Paris Climate Accord, state 
officials were vowing to meet standards alone. Governors Cuomo 
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and Brown, New York and California, each promised their 
commitment to the Clean Power Plan, despite the 
Trump Administration's actions. 222 New York Attorney General 
Eric Schneiderman vowed to lead a coalition of State Attorneys 
General challenging the action, going so far as to say he would take 
it to the Supreme Court.223 The beauty of these actions is not merely 
opposing or advocating for a policy that may or may not be favorable, 
but the ability vested in the states to take action on climate change. 
X. CONCLUSION 
Climate change is an overtly politicized matter, and the analysis 
has not shied away from this; it is no secret that states with 
opposing heads of government to President Trump will relish taking 
climate change action first and allocating resources in defiance of 
the Trump Administration. If de-politicization of climate change is 
to occur effectively, states must act evenly and remove personal or 
political animus from the equation, to administer and create climate 
change initiatives uniformly. Each state carries a varied and 
distinct risk of climate change harm or benefit; state governments 
can react in a way the most environmentally friendly federal 
government could not. Professor Felix Mormann summarizes the 
merits of federal versus state government initiatives as follows: 
Those who argue for implementation at the federal level 
point to the better fit with the inter-state nature of the U.S. 
electricity grid, efficiency gains from a unified, national 
market for trading RECs and the reduced risk of regulatory 
leakage. Proponents of state-level renewable portfolio 
standards, on the other, hand, argue that existing state 
policy activism displaces the need for federal action, states 
are better positioned to account for local renewable 
resources, and have historically been tasked with 
d t . . h . £ 1· 224 e erm1n1ng t eir own energy port o 10s. 
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State governments are too capable and too talented at responding 
to climate change to let it remain subject to the inert political 
dangers it faces at the national level. 
The analysis and explanation above was meant to provide a 
framework, or blueprint, of sorts, illustrating authorized, legal 
action that states can take to combat climate change. There is much 
at stake in the fight against climate change and the actions taken 
by states cannot be mired in complex legal challenges and 
adjudicatory actions. Beyond legality of action, extensive precedent 
and example for states to act were provided, and the ability to, at 
times, go past the state legislatures was explored as well. Be it 
negotiating with foreign leaders or entering compacts with various 
states within the union, states have more capacity now than ever 
before to take up arms the climate change fight. 
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